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Our goal is to summarize the collective experience of fifteen organizations in dealing with 
uncoordinated efforts that result in unnecessary delays in understanding, predicting, preparing for, 
containing, and mitigating the COVID-19 pandemic in the USA. Response efforts involve the collection 
and analysis of data corresponding to healthcare organizations, public health departments, 
socioeconomic indicators, as well as additional signals collected directly from individuals and 
communities. We focused on Electronic Health Records (EHRs) data, since EHRs can be leveraged 
and scaled to improve clinical care, research, and to inform public health decision-making. We outline 
the current challenges in the data ecosystem and the technology infrastructure that are relevant to 
COVID-19, as witnessed in our fifteen institutions. The infrastructure includes registries and clinical 
data networks to support population-level analyses. We propose a specific set of strategic next steps to 
increase interoperability, overall organization and efficiencies. 
Introduction
Responding to a public health emergency, such as the current COVID-19 pandemic, requires access to 
and analysis of large and timely volumes of data[1] with goals of providing timely and appropriate 
information to policy makers, keeping the public safe by making resources available where needed, 
and conducting research to advance our collective knowledge of such pandemics for future 
preparedness.  Unfortunately, there are many barriers in building a robust and scalable infrastructure 
needed to enable such “digital public health”[2]. Investments of federal, state, county, and city funds, as 
well as of private funds are limited by political and geographic divisions[2].  When emergent situations 
require rapid response by public health departments, and extant infrastructure and data are not 
sufficient to meet those needs, the solution often involves the use of an emergency public health 
directive whereby healthcare provider organizations (HPOs) and supporting clinical services (e.g., 
clinical laboratories, etc.) are required to submit data for reporting purposes[3] using a myriad of often 
changing data definitions, encoding standards, and transmission mechanisms -- all of which incur 
substantial burden to those organizations[4]. The lack of coordination between and among various 
entities, as well as the insufficiency of technical infrastructure[5],  result in substantial expense, sub-
optimal outcomes, and missed opportunities for timely and impactful public health interventions[6]. 
Here, we address the current challenges and limitations and propose realistic steps towards a health 
information infrastructure that serves the needs of patients, clinicians and public health authorities to 
address pandemics in a timely fashion. 
 
EHRs contain many important data elements that can help with a pandemic response[7,8]. Although 
EHRs have known shortcomings as the sole source of data for studies that inform public health 
decisions[9], utilization of a large number of records from many institutions could help provide mission-














Limitations of current initiatives to use EHRs beyond the care of an individual
Multiple initiatives now exist to physically or virtually aggregate EHR and related data for COVID-
19[11,12], and single system data have been used to support clinical investigations of a few health 
conditions[13]. These efforts in the USA are in large part limited to academic medical center networks 
and have not been focused on public health, although some initial actions hold promise. For example, 
specific codes for COVID-19-related data have been introduced into controlled terminologies employed 
in EHRs or their derivatives; large consortia are trying to build robust cohort definitions to ensure 
reproducibility in the harmonization and utilization of concepts across various institutions. In the USA, 
many EHR-based initiatives consist of building (a) specific registries for SARS-COV-2 tested 
individuals and for those diagnosed with COVID-19, or (b) activation of clinical data networks (CDNs) to 
access COVID-19 data included in EHRs. Table 1 shows some differences between these types of 
initiatives. 
Academic medical centers have been responsible for a large portion of research involving 
EHRs[14,15]. From the perspective of our 15 institutions and from interacting with colleagues in similar 
positions, EHR-based COVID-19 data collection and sharing initiatives are currently stretching the roles 
of information technology (IT) and informatics teams within the health systems providing such data, 
which are also trying to provide care, conduct research and educate healthcare workers during the 
pandemic. Registries and CDNs frequently adopt different data models, standards, and governance 
structures, leading the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to sponsor a project to “harmonize a list of 
COVID-19 data elements with several Common Data Models (CDMs) and open standards”[16]. In our 
experience, although many HPOs participate in more than one initiative, few resources have been 
added to IT and informatics teams in order to support COVID-19 specific activities, and few existing 
responsibilities have been scaled back. While a larger survey is needed in order to represent the 
perspective of a larger spectrum of medical centers, the COVID-19 pandemic has revealed important 
challenges in responding to EHR data-related requests in an accurate and timely fashion at our 
institutions. Some are related to the nature of the data; for example, any inferences on therapies 
through data aggregation across institutions must take into account the difficulties in accounting for 
important confounders related to practice variations, availability of medications, patient socioeconomic 
status, type of insurance coverage and other biases. Thus EHR-based evidence must not be 
interpreted as a substitute for well-designed randomized trials[17]. On the other hand, EHRs can 
provide an important resource to describe outcomes or interventions in real life, since strict eligibility 
criteria and design constraints do not always allow extrapolation of clinical trial findings to the 
population at large. Utilizing EHRs in support of reporting for the COVID-19 pandemic unveiled the 
fragility of the health data infrastructure in support of a public health emergency, in a similar way as 
others have discussed for comparative effectiveness research[18] and healthcare quality 
improvement[19]. The focus of this perspective is not to assess the value of EHRs for observational 
studies, but instead to describe the inadequacy of infrastructure to use EHRs for public health 
reporting. We do not cover in this article the inadequacy of this infrastructure for other types of data 













To understand how IT teams are being stretched thin, consider the example list of COVID-19 initiatives 
(Figure 1, Table 2) that are requesting COVID-related EHR or associated data from healthcare and 
public health organizations to then make available de-identified individual patient-level records or 
aggregated data for a variety of operational, population and clinical or translational research purposes. 
Such COVID-19 data sharing and reporting activities (at the national level) are currently led by a 
combination of health agencies (e.g., CDC’s National Health Safety Network, FDA’s Evidence 
accelerator), media and IT companies (e.g. New York Times COVID-19 dashboards, Apple’s mobility 
data), academic medical centers (e.g., Hopkins Resource, COVID-19 Data Discovery Index) and 
professional societies (e.g., American Society of Microbiology’s COVID registry, Society of Critical Care 
Medicine's VIRUS registry).  This “snapshot” of COVID-19 data and analytic resources spanning 
patient information from EHRs to social media and population-level summaries is evolving quickly, as 
are governmental and philanthropic funding opportunities for related efforts. We display simple axes of 
“public/private” access to data and whether “individual records or data aggregates” to illustrate the 
diversity of initiatives at a single point in time, and to show the dichotomy between data accessibility 
and detail or granularity. This illustration of the COVID-19 data sharing “environment” also suggests 
that connections among the initiatives are unclear for those who are not intimately familiar with their 
organization, with many initiatives investing efforts in organizing data from the same patients or 
populations, with ensuing deleterious outcomes in terms of costs, efficiency, and time-to-insight. 
Further, in our experience many institutions are maintaining different data marts for each initiative, 
often where different “common” data models are being utilized (thus mitigating the benefit of such 
“common” data models). In addition, different types of approvals for sharing patient-level and group-
level (i.e., aggregate) data with various types of data “consumers” are also required, adding further 
regulatory and data privacy complexity. Most initial efforts should continue, but increasing attention 
needs to be paid to duplications and gaps, as well as to a common convergence point, which should 
include integration into public health information systems. 
Current challenges to connect EHR and public health information systems
In addition to research-related use of data, there is also a need for the collection and integration of data 
from EHR systems and its communication to public health information systems in order to inform critical 
policy-making and intervention planning. Additionally, forecasting the need for ICU beds, ventilators, 
protective gear, etc., depends heavily on data generated in medical centers.  While not highly dissimilar 
from many biomedical research uses of such data, the timeliness and nature of public health data 
needs does differ substantially.  EHRs focus on individuals, while public health focuses on populations. 
While there can be shared data sources such as the EHRs, a myriad of other public health data from 
test sites detached from HPOs, county data, and care delivered at facilities such as nursing homes[20] 
and prisons does not typically get included in HPO records. The current state of COVID-19 data 
reflects a patchwork of uncoordinated, temporary fixes to a historically neglected public safety function. 
As the US enters its second decade of nationally-coordinated digital infrastructure for healthcare 
delivery and to modernize patient care[21], COVID-19 has demonstrated that this infrastructure is 
inadequate to respond to public health emergencies[22]. Developing interconnected health data nodes 













registries, and patient-reported data is critical to a COVID-19 response and multiple other health 
conditions. An IT infrastructure to support public health that leverages EHRs and associated health 
data is needed, but cannot be built overnight. 
While public health tools for horizon scanning, disease surveillance, epidemiological modeling, capacity 
planning, “hot spotting,” and targeted intervention strategies (such as isolation or contact tracing in the 
case of a transmissible pathogen) use as much available data as possible, the speed with which these 
data are collected, organized and analyzed is slow. The mode of data collection/transmission 
challenges aggregation, harmonization, and analysis. Also, analytic methods lag behind, and much 
information contained in the EHRs ends up underutilized. In our experience, there is a high burden of 
ad-hoc reporting mechanisms under emergency public health directives on HPOs whose primary role is 
to support clinical service providers. Developing a scalable solution that serves the needs of the current 
pandemic, leverages national investments in EHR systems, and anticipates public health data needs 
for the future could positively impact the management of “chronic” public health problems and stretch 
public dollars invested in a myriad of disconnected efforts that may not result in durable solutions. 
Investments that fill notable gaps between EHR systems and public health data needs could be a first 
step towards a coordinated effort to prepare for and respond to public health emergencies. Even when 
population health tools are deployed, they typically do not allow for cross-institutional data utilization. 
EHRs are not focused primarily on enabling population or public health responses, much less 
systematic or rigorous analyses that we need in order to enable the kinds of insights and responses 
that crises like COVID-19, the opioid crisis, and natural disasters require. A single HPO may not have 
sufficient numbers to discover patterns in the data, and vendor-specific population health tools may be 
limited to institutions using the same system. The efforts shown in Figure 1, for example, do not use 
vendor-based cross-institutional population health tools.
The public health information infrastructure does not currently support large-scale coordination[23]. In 
our experience, gathering information in an evolving pandemic requires multiple submissions for each 
case to various agencies, frequent changes to concept definitions, and multiple kinds of data; building 
capabilities that can facilitate efficiency requires thoughtful logic and standards. It requires a concerted 
initiative to overcome complex socio-cultural, ethical, legal, and trust dimensions that underpin all of the 
preceding issues, influencing both short and long-term decision-making, and further, the engagement 
of at-risk or underserved communities. 
Preparation, installation, storage, maintenance, and utilization of each COVID-19 data resource incurs 
costs paid by various public and private institutions and internal HPO resources; the latter have been 
dramatically depleted due to the pandemic, with most if not all HPOs posting unprecedented losses in 
revenue. Even taking financial costs aside, the complex web of initiatives can be confusing, qualified 
personnel to operate them is scarce, and results may be suboptimal because not all important data are 
captured in structured format. Although many health information exchanges (HIEs) promote data 
exchange to support health care, they are seldom able to be used for research or public health. In their 
current stage, most HIEs do not retain copies of detailed individual-level data, which could be used to 
create a community-wide, longitudinal patient record, and therefore cannot be used for public health 













efforts in connecting EHR data for public health purposes. Although, ideally, longitudinal data would be 
collected, since measurement of outcomes such as readmissions can be undercounted if the 
readmission occurs at a different medical center, data from single hospitalizations can be useful to help 
assess clinical course and short-term, in-hospital prognoses.  
A call to action 
It is time to start recognizing teamwork and investing in sustainable solutions to modernize and connect 
public health and healthcare IT infrastructures[24], as well as framing roles for each member of the 
team to scale up local efforts. The US's inadequate response to the pandemic might be associated, in 
part, with inadequate coordination of data from clinical settings. Academic Medical Centers (AMCs) are 
important sources of data, but critical data cannot originate from AMCs only. It must come from other 
HPOs such as nursing homes, community hospitals and federally qualified healthcare centers that 
often are not equipped to participate in IT consortia, even though some of these have functional EHR 
systems. These entities cover a significant portion of the underserved population, so it is imperative 
that they are represented in the data resources. Even for academic medical centers, while some were 
quick to respond to changes dictated by the COVID-19 crisis and prepare data for internal use and 
sharing with other entities, others lagged behind in understanding what to do, when and how. Informal 
processes of consulting IT colleagues at other institutions filled an immediate gap to patch problems 
quickly, but this was not scalable, leaving a significant population of IT and informatics personnel 
solving and resolving the same problems locally. 
While we do not advocate for centralization of efforts or picking one solution to fit all needs, we trust 
that a well-articulated national strategy and efficient, inclusive bridges can be built across various 
initiatives, and a convergence strategy must be designed. The federal government could play the same 
founding role as it did with the Internet and allow this infrastructure to develop and thrive independently 
after an initial injection of resources and buy-in of a well-designed strategy that engages multiple 
stakeholders. The funds may even already exist, but without coordination there will continue to be 
duplications and gaps, and no clear point of convergence. Key to the organization of multiple COVID-
19 data resources will be a divide-and-conquer strategy, assembling cooperative teams that promote 
innovation to overhaul the status quo in three key components areas:
Technology
Arguably the easiest area to address, technical issues must be resolved in order to allow easy 
interoperability across institutions and across EHR- and public health systems. At a minimum, we need:
1. Use as few common data models, standards, and base analytic tools as possible to 
promote scientific discoveries for COVID-19 and beyond, to permit exploratory analyses and 
easy reproducibility of hypothesis testing. While the data may reside in different systems, a 
standardized way to map and consult the data across various systems should be developed. 
Hardened application programming interfaces (APIs) for EHRs and clinical studies should be 
easily available. These APIs could allow data sharing while also supporting governance 













Centralization of data in limited scope registries for which governance and access rules are not 
established upfront should be avoided, and transparency in the oversight on use of all data 
should be increased. As mentioned before, while data provenance and curation are easier to 
verify in registries, data changes over time and researchers’ need to establish benchmarks 
beyond the immediate focus of the registry require broader data. Use of EHR-based data in 
CDNs is very helpful in this context, but more difficult to coordinate. 
2. Explore ways to extend and enhance existing data interchange standards and interfaces to 
ensure they can fully support the needs of public health departments in the context of an 
emergent situation (e.g., common data models, terminologies, APIs).  These efforts should also 
include the engagement of HIEs and HPOs to determine how and in what capacities they can 
support such efforts. Existing tools should be considered before creating new ones. No new 
“common” data models should be created, as existing ones can be extended and, ideally, 
converge into fewer ones. 
3. Deploy technologies that help ethics boards evaluate and monitor patient data use for 
research and public health quickly. Obsolete regulations that neither protect patient data or allow 
data to be used properly must be replaced. 
Governance and Policy 
Twentieth century regulations and practices plague efforts to share data responsibly. For example, 
there is little in between (a) unlimited use of data for a public health emergency by governments and 
their associates and (b) overly-restricting regulations on EHR data sharing by clinicians and 
researchers, even during a pandemic. Transferring non-consented so-called “de-identified” data or 
limited data sets into centralized registries is still considered more practical than solutions that keep 
data at HPOs. Twenty-first century artificial intelligence algorithms in which no human actually “sees” 
the patient-level data are left out of consideration in the privacy debate, as are emergency research 
initiatives. We recommend: 
1. Elimination of systematic barriers across the data ecosystem - obsolete processes that 
rely on synchronous decision making by often voluntary or sometimes disengaged/uninformed 
bodies, certain information security officers and business executives, can cause unnecessary 
delays in processing data requests by Institutional Review Boards, contracting offices (data 
use/data sharing agreements, Business Associate Agreements with clinical partners), even in an 
emergency situation, despite specific directives [25], [26]. Health data that could be immediately 
useful for public health are not necessarily key deliverables for healthcare systems. They should 
be, but county, state and federal directives do not always make it clear what needs to be 
reported.
2. Investigation of both centralized, decentralized and hybrid solutions to enhance 
transparency into who has access to the data for what purposes, under what type of consent. 
This requires the implementation of a system of accountability for using data (i.e., rules of 
engagement or behavior). It requires the development of trust and verification systems, e.g., 
effective log analysis tools and a well specified and auditable code of conduct. Over the past 













time when there has been an increase in demand for electronic health information. Incentives for 
sharing have declined while the risks, including cyberattacks, have increased. The perceived 
value of sharing is relatively low by those who do not understand the importance of large sample 
sizes. Ongoing training is critical to ensure that people accessing the data systems are qualified 
to make optimal use of them. Ethics boards must continue to enforce the highest standards for 
COVID-19 data, with modernized processes. We do not advocate for government-controlled 
repositories of EHR data for COVID-19 patients, as they constitute a single point of failure as 
well as a single point of breach. We also do not advocate for or against commercial repositories, 
but we advocate instead for a system of accountability and transparency that promotes efficient, 
ethical use of EHR data even in public health emergencies. Involvement of law makers, 
researchers, clinicians, patient representatives, and government agencies will be key to the 
development of a new strategy. Institutions such as the National Academies or professional 
organizations such as AMIA should be summoned to promote open discussion and propose 
solutions. 
3. Creation or enhancement of coordinating bodies spanning public health departments, 
HPOs, and supporting clinical service providers (e.g., laboratories), to ensure that processes 
are established and harmonized (in advance) for the rapid transfer and integration of data in a 
public health emergency that will work across a multi-EHR ecosystem.  This would ideally 
involve the establishment of standard operating procedures and well-defined definitions of 
minimum data sets, transmission and encoding standards.  Expectations for the frequency of 
data refreshes and submissions must be commensurate with the specific situation and 
resources.
4. Coordination of virtual, harmonized “clearinghouses” for digital public health at the local, 
regional, state, federal and global levels, wherein data flow, integration, and analytics can serve 
local needs and be communicated one step above or below, in such a manner that eliminates 
communications that skip levels and add burden, and thus increases speed, efficiency, and 
economies of scale.  These could be transient (in an emergency) or durable (to assist in the 
satisfaction of chronic public health challenges), and could involve the engagement of impartial 
“honest brokers.”  As part of such “clearinghouses”, clear expectations about data de-
identification, access controls, and the “firewalling” of data where competitive or contrary 
interests exist, will be critical. Neutral, highly specialized auditing teams should be allowed to 
evaluate data, processes, and analytical results and reproduce results. Various local, state, and 
federal agencies must agree on how their roles and responsibilities complement each other, and 
make them clear to the public. 
Strategy
Just as the nation has benefited from investments over the past 15 years to encourage EHR adoption 
and “meaningful use”, a high level of investment is needed today to ensure we are ready for future 
crises. Significant improvements and capabilities in recent years in EHR adoption allow us to respond 
to this crisis in ways that would not have been possible a decade ago. And yet, there remain 
inadequacies in our collective health IT infrastructure that make responding to population-level events 













To implement the recommendations above, rather than focusing on such needs as “secondary” uses of 
EHRs, HIEs and the data they produce and manage, the use of our Health IT infrastructure for such 
activities must become another “primary” function of such systems. Achieving this requires a holistic 
and systematic approach (Figure 2) that not only focuses on technological solutions, but also focuses 
on the regulatory, financial and socio-organizational alignments that make such uses possible, or 
create head-winds when they are not addressed. Only by doing so will we create a health IT 
infrastructure that simultaneously allows for excellent individualized, precision healthcare, while also 
enabling evidence-generation and the creation of a learning health system. There needs to be a 
significant effort in designing a system of incentives and investments to make data sharing for public 
health a measurable, worthwhile component of what HPOs do. Therefore, we are calling for a bold 
program that capitalizes and builds upon investments to date. We should:
1. Make “Hard decisions:” While acknowledging the noble intent and value of initiatives to date, 
recognize that the way to move forward requires changes. For example, we need to address how 
data are collected, entered into EHR systems, and how these data will be used beyond individual 
patient care. We thus need to design better interfaces that enable data to be captured 
according to standards while allowing clinicians to provide care without extra barriers. 
2. Provide incentives to learn from successful HIEs, disease registries and CDNs and develop 
novel models for networks of EHRs that can be used for public health and research in addition to 
clinical care in a manner that leverages, but is not bound or limited by proprietary, vendor-based 
concerns, and that also protects patient privacy. For example, require that vendor systems 
provide robust tools that enable data to map to common data models. 
3. Engage the whole IT, informatics, public health, epidemiologic, and administration 
communities (public, private, and non-profit sectors) for common understanding of informatics 
issues and concerns, including standardization of epidemiologic research designs and methods 
that use EHR data. Address hurdles for data sharing due to commercial interests. 
4. Invest research dollars in novel, integrative methods, tools, and technology. In parallel with 
the investigation of therapies and vaccines, information technology tools will be required to 
prioritize and organize the logistics of these health interventions and evaluation of their efficacy. 
While investments towards a few “data coordinating center” roles have been announced, they are 
scattered and do not appear to integrate HPO and public health infrastructure. 
5. Establish the role of Population Health Directors or equivalent at each HPO, who should 
oversee both outpatient and inpatient populations and be partially funded by public health 
departments, commensurate with their role in ensuring that timely, quality-controlled data related 
to public health is accessible to local public health authorities. This director should be held 
accountable for integration of HPO information into public health information systems. While this 
will require an increase in funding for HPOs to support public health activities, this will reduce 
duplication and waste that happens in an uncoordinated set of initiatives, and savings that should 














Developing, implementing and evaluating a practical convergence plan for EHR-based data sharing 
networks and platforms and public health information systems requires the orchestration of expertise 
from several specialties. It requires public support that moves politicians to write legislation that 
allocates needed resources and holds recipients accountable. A careful and coordinated approach will 
generate consistent understanding of what is possible to be answered with EHRs and allow 
stakeholders to feel more confident about emerging analyses. This will also allow HPOs to focus on 
reducing the impact of the pandemic, rather than dealing with the multiple regulatory, logistic, and 
technical requests for their data. Effective data systems will enable implementation of new discoveries 
in communities, health systems, and policy; the implementations will directly impact the health of 
communities.
Unless COVID-19 data initiatives are coordinated and systems are interoperable, much effort and 
money will be spent into each initiative individually: these initiatives will compete with each other, will 
only provide partial answers, and will still not properly support public health decision making for this 
and the next pandemic, and for other diseases that have a large national impact. Worse, if funds are 
put into the development of yet another registry or COVID-19 data network, resources will be further 
diluted. If new infrastructure is built now to fill immediate needs for COVID-19 data, it may not create 
durable assets that will help us respond to the next pandemic. The public health system was caught 
off-guard by COVID-19, but not to be prepared for its next wave or for the next pandemic is 
inexcusable. Our call to action for durable assets should reduce the costs for the nation in the long-
term, both in terms of direct expenditures and in personnel hours; more, it should reduce opportunity 
costs for organizations, where focusing on the variety of data sharing activities requested precludes 
these entities from implementing enhanced quality control and innovation. However, measuring 
impacts can be challenging. How many lives have been directly or indirectly affected is difficult to 
assess. If we are successful in converging valuable initiatives to the point where data from HPOs can 
be efficiently used in public health information systems, we should see clear differences in response to 
future pandemics and to endemic issues related to the exchange and analysis of health data. The 
return on investment (i.e., value) can be defined in terms of costs and benefits -- increased discovery of 
knowledge and its application to patients and health systems. In a pandemic, many stakeholders 
(policy-makers, health systems, public health, and, most importantly, individuals) must adapt rapidly; 
the cost of this adaptation in our current fragmented system has been overwhelming. 
We call all stakeholders to act now to build a coordinated system of data sharing to combat COVID-19, 
and to prepare for the inevitable next pandemic. Successful implementation of the measures outlined in 
this article will enable evidence-based approaches to coordinate testing and contact tracing, predict 
needed resources and prepare accordingly (so “non-essential” healthcare services will not need to be 
shut down unnecessarily), conduct basic, preventive or therapeutic research, and provide a trusted, 
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Figure 1. COVID-19 data initiatives. Initiatives are categorized by data type, public/private access, 
individual- or aggregate-level data. Inventory resources classified as Individual indicate that case-level 
data (Protected Health Information, limited data sets or HIPAA “de-identified” data) is available to users 
of the resource. Resources classified as Aggregate indicate that summaries and averages are 
available to users of the resource. Bubble size = estimated size of available data. The colors indicate 
the types of data available to users of the resource. Only resources with a website and contact 
information are included (see Table 2 for URLs of individual resources and the scale of each resource).
Figure 2. Conceptual model for an evolving digital public health ecosystem. A durable information 
infrastructure to overcome existing challenges requires careful coordination and leverage of existing 
resources. Most of the components for a future, integrated system are already in place, with the 
pathways moving forward requiring agreement or translation among standards, governance structures, 
and clear definitions of roles and responsibilities. “Chronic” public health issues refer to long-term 
challenges such as healthcare-acquired infections or prescription overdose. API: Application 
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Figure 2: Conceptual model for an evolving digital public health ecosystem 
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Table 1. Registries and Clinical Data Network (CDN) based on EHR derived data
Type of Data Resource Benefits Challenges
Disease-based (e.g., 
COVID-19) Registry
● Centralized harmonization and 
curation of data
● Easier to manage
● Specific data items for the disease 
are harmonized and curated 
centrally
● Feasibility of informed consent for 
use of data
● Privacy and institutional 
risks associated with 
transferring data to a 
central repository
● Less transparency on data 
use
● Comparisons with other 
diseases not possible
● Threat of a
single-point-of-failure
● Labor intensive if each site 
needs to standardize and 
curate the data
Clinical data network ● Typically involves a distributed 
network of clinics, HPOs and/or 
research centers
● Data not restricted to patients with 
the disease, or to data items directly 
related to the disease
● Comparisons with “controls” and 
with patients with other diseases is 
possible
● No single point of failure unless 
there is dependency on a central 
hub
● High number of individuals 
and records requires 
additional security and 
privacy safeguards
● Detailed, curated data on 
the disease of interest is 
not always available
● Harmonization of complex 
data elements is hard to 
coordinate
● Analytics may require 
special methods
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Table 2: Partial list of COVID-19 data initiatives
Scale Initiative Resource name Resource URL




Apple Mobility Apple Mobility Trends Reports https://www.apple.com/covid19/mobility
ASM American Society of Microbiology COVID Research Registry
https://asm.org/COVID/COVID-19-
Research-Registry/Home
C-19RD COVID-19 research database https://covid19researchdatabase.org/
CORD-19 COVID-19 Open Research Dataset Challenge (CORD-19)
https://www.kaggle.com/allen-institute-
for-ai/CORD-19-research-challenge
COVID-19 DDI COVID-19 Data Discovery Index www.covid19dataindex.org
Evidence 
Accelerator FDA Evidence Accelerator program https://www.focr.org/covid19
Facebook 




Resource Center Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/us-map
Host Genetics COVID-19 Host Genetics Initiative https://www.covid19hg.org
NY Times 
COVID-19 NY Times COVID-19 Data
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nytim
es/covid-19-data
OHDSI OHDSI study-a-thon https://www.ohdsi.org/covid-19-updates/
Our World in 









R2D2 Reliable Response Data Discovery for Clinical COVID-19 Consultations using Patient Observations https://covid19questions.org
SECURE-IBD Surveillance, Epidemiology of Coronavirus (COVID-19) Under Research Exclusion https://covidibd.org/
TrinetX TriNetX network https://www.trinetx.com/coronavirus/
Global
Worldometer Worldometer https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/





ACTIV (Accelerating COVID-19 Therapeutic 
Interventions and Vaccines): NIH clinical trials network 
for COVID vaccines testing
https://www.nih.gov/research-
training/medical-research-initiatives/activ
BEAT19 Behavior, Environment And Treatments for Covid-19 (BEAT19)
https://github.com/beat19-org/beat19-
public-data
C19HCC COVID-19 Healthcare Coalition (C19HCC) https://mcovid.org/
C3I Cancer Center Cessation Initiative (C3I) + COVID https://sites.google.com/wisc.edu/c3icovidsmoking/grantee-resources
CCC19 COVID Cancer Consortium (CCC19) https://ccc19.org/
CIVET
North American AIDS Cohort Collaboration on 
Research and Design (NA-ACCORD) Corona 
Infectious Virus Epidemiology Team (CIVET)
https://naaccord.org/covid-19
COVID Tracking The COVID Tracking Project https://covidtracking.com/
CovidCP CovidCP clinical trials registry  
eMERGE eMERGE network to support COVID research https://emerge-network.org
National
HD4Action
RWJF Health Data 4 Action COVID-19  Registry (with 
AcademyHealth, Health Care Cost Institute (HCCI), 
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N3C N3C (National COVID Cohort Collaborative): Building a Nationwide COVID-19 Cohort Through Informatics covid.cd2h.org/N3C

















CDC's SARS-CoV-2 Sequencing for Public Health 
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